Free Will and Determinism, part 7

Introduction: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism.html
Part 2: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-2.html
Part 3: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-3.html
Part 4: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-4.html
Part 5: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-5.html
Part 6: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/09/free-will-and-determinism-part-6.html

It should seem that modeling perfect foreknowledge should be easy. After all, whatever is known is true, so setting up an equality between what is known and what is ture should be it.

Unfortunately, this is not enough. Truth can change. Consider any event. Prior to the event I can know that the event will happen. During the event I can know that it is happening. After the event I can know that it did happen. While these three statements of knowledge all refer to the same event, they are logically distinct states. Since we are explicitly dealing with temporal considerations, we need to factor in this transition. For the purposes of this discussion, we will consider two points of view with regards to a true proposition: knowledge of the proposition in the state in which it is true (current knowledge), and knowledge of the proposition in the state prior to the state in which it is true (foreknowledge):

fK(x) - foreknowledge of x; I know x will be true in the future in the next state.
nK(x) - current knowledge of x; I know that x is true in this state.

To formalize the relationship between these two types of knowledge, we will say:

If, in the current state, si, there is foreknowledge of some proposition x, then x is true in some state sj and (si,sj) is in R (a valid transition). The reverse is also true. If x is true in the current state, sj, and (si,sj) is in R (a valid transition), then I have foreknowledge of x in si.

Now we tie this in with our concept of choices discussed in the previous section:

If I am presented with a choice between A & B in the current state, si, then, also in this current state, I have either: foreknowledge of A and not B; or foreknowledge of B and not A.


Combined with our previous definition of Free Will, we have the following three definitions:

From this we construct our argument.
1. Given: I have a choice between A & B in the current state, si.

2. Applying defintion #2 to our given, I have either: foreknowledge of A and not B; or foreknowledge of B and not A.

Case 1:

a. I have foreknowledge of A and not B (in the current state, si).

b. I do not have foreknowledge of B

c. Since, according to definition #3, foreknowledge of a proposition entails the truth of that proposition in some state where that state can be transitioned from the current state, and vice versa. Thus, since I do not have foreknowledge of B, either B is not true in any state, or the state(s) in which it is true cannot be transitioned to from the current state.

d. Since we cannot transition from the current state to a state in which B is true (either because B is not true in any state, or it is true in a state that we cannot transition to), then our requirements for definition #1 are not met, therefore either we have not been presented a choice with possible outcome B, or we do not have Free Will regarding that choice.

Case 2:

Case to follows the same pattern as Case 1, swapping B with A, with the same conclusion:

Since we cannot transition from the current state to a state in which A is true (either because A is not true in any state, or it is true in a state that we cannot transition to), then our requirements for definition #1 are not met, therefore either we have not been presented a choice with possible outcome A, or we do not have Free Will regarding that choice.

Continuation from Main argument:

3. Since all possible cases result in the same conclusion, that conclusion is true, therefore we either have not been presented with a choice, or we do not have Free Will regarding that choice.

4. We have been presented with a choice (Given)

5. Therefore, we do not have Free Will regarding that choice.

[Click Pictures for Larger Image]

To recap:
If we define Free Will of a choice in terms of whether or not the outcomes of that choice are logically accessible, and divine knowledge as having foreknowledge of only one outcome, then we see that said foreknowledge restricts which possible paths are accessible. Forknowledge of one outcome makes all paths leading to the other outcome inaccessible and, thus, eliminates Free Will.

Again, this is an incompatabilist argument, it only shows the incompatability between Free Will and a form of determinism. In this case, divine foreknowledge. It makes no claim as to whether or not Free Will or divine foreknowledge exists, just that they cannot coexist.

That is not to say that this argument is without significance. Any world view that insists on Free Will and divine foreknowledge existing together is not logically coherent. It rests upon some premise that is not correct. This applies to many interpretations of Judeochristian religions. Our status as sinners deserving of punishment and unworthy of salvation stems directly from the fact that our actions perform of our own Free Will. Furthermore, part of God's divine nature is his omniscience, the fact that he knows all. These intepretations are invalid and must be abandoned.

Free Will and Determinism, part 6

Introduction: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism.html
Part 2: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-2.html
Part 3: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-3.html
Part 4: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-4.html
Part 5: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-5.html
Part 6: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/09/free-will-and-determinism-part-6.html
Part 7: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/09/free-will-and-determinism-part-7.html

Having established a logical basis with which to discuss Free Will and foreknowledge, we now must define those terms using the language of that logical model. We have previously identified two primary interpretations of Free Will: the ability to do (choose) otherwise, and to be the ultimate source of one's choices. We will first tailor our definition toward the first, and then deal with the second later.

As a note and caveat, we will talk of Free Will as, primarily, the ability to do otherwise. This is easiest for visualization purposes. We implicitly acknowledge the objection to defining Free Will discussed in part 2, and note that, to avoid this objection, we can simply substitute "choose" wherever we use "do."

Furthermore, we need to define Free Will that addresses the issues brought up in part 3, by using the tree/bridge example and applying it to our logical model.

To recap: One comatabilist refutation has been that, we can have Free Will, even if the present and future are determined by the past, by noting that the past could have been otherwise, therefore the present could have been otherwise and, therefore, we could have done otherwise, thus meeting the criteria for Free Will.

This refutation was criticized by constructing a scenario that meets this interpretation but, nevertheless, results in the conclusion that we did not have a Free Choice available to us:

There is a storm which knocks down a tree blocking a bridge.

Across the bridge is an injured person, but I cannot reach him.

Since it could have been that the storm did not knock down the tree, it also could have been that the bridge was free and I went across to help him.

Therefore, I had Free Will in not helping the injured person

This is nonsensical. In the case where the tree fell, no choice was even presented for us to choose, freely or otherwise. Displayed visually:

We only have a choice to make in the green circle, and that is the only circumstance in which we can reasonable say we have Free Will. To suggest that we have Free Will in the red circle would suggest that, we chose not to help the person and, by most moral codes, are morally responsible for that person suffering.

This representation can be easily translated to our logical system. Each circle above represents a state, and the text in there represents the propositions true at that state.

Propositions:

w = "a storm happens"
f = "a tree falls"
~f = "a tree does not fall"
h = "I help the person"
~h = "I do not help the person"

Sets:
AP = {w, f, ~f, h, ~h}
s0 = {w}
s1 = {f}
s2 = {~f}
s3 = {h}
s4 = {~h}
R = {(s0, s1), (s0, s2), (s1, s4), (s2, s3), (s2, s4)}

If we replace the circles with the labels for their respective states, we get:

Note that, in tracing a path from one state to the next, each step can be found in R. That is, this is a visual representation of all possible paths. With this representation we can formulate a definition of Free Will:

Free Will occurs when we are presented with a choice such that, for all outcomes of that choice, we can transition to a state where the outcome of that choice has occur.

More formally, we can define a choice between A and B as C(A,B) and our definition as: If C(A,B) is true in some state si and we have Free Will with regards to that choice, then either: A is true in some state sj, such that (si,sj) is in R (a valid transition); or B is true in some state sk, such that (si,sk) is in R (a valid transition).

Another representation:

Thus, even if we consider the red circle to contain a choice between A (Helping) and B (Not Helping) the choice isn't free because, while there is a valid transition between that state and B there is no valid transition between that state and A. Thus, no Free Will.

Next: Determinism

Free Will and Determinism, part 5

Introduction: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism.html
Part 2: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-2.html
Part 3: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-3.html
Part 4: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-4.html
Part 5: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-5.html
Part 6: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/09/free-will-and-determinism-part-6.html
Part 7: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/09/free-will-and-determinism-part-7.html

Having provided support for the incompatiblist view, we have only shown the relationship between determinism and Free Will. This is only relevant in the event that one or the other is true (which makes the other false) or in examining world views that incorporate compatibilism as a fundamental component (which makes those world views false).

Causal determinism is generally dismissed as being false, at least to the degree necessary to support incompatabilist arguments. What other kinds of determinism are there?

Divine foreknowledge (or any sort of perfect foreknowledge, regardless of its nature) is a form of determinism, but we must demonstrate this.

In other forays into this topic, I have tried to use modal logic (previously discussed) to represent the concepts here, but have found it to be insufficient. I have found other forms of logic that work better. Rather than simply dive into them, I will build up to them from the ground level.

Propositions:
A proposition is any statement that can have a truth value assigned to it. "I have a five dollar bill in my pocket" is a proposition. It can be true or false. "Come here" is a command, not a proposition; it has no truth value.

An atomic proposition is a proposition that cannot be broken up into simpler propositions. "I have a five dollar bill and a ten dollar bill in my pocket" is not an atomic proposition as it can be broken up into "I have a five dollar bill in my pocket" and "I have a ten dollar bill in my pocket," each of which are atomic propositions.

For simplicity, we can represent propositions by using variables, rather than write them out each time we wish to refer to them. For example: p = "I have a five dollar bill in my pocket" and q = "I have a ten dollar bill in my pocket." Usually, we assign lables only to atomic propositions and represent more complex propositions by connecting atomic propositions with the appropriate logical connectives:

p AND q = "I have a five dollar bill in my pocket and I have a ten dollar bill in my pocket."

Sets:
Sets are a mathematical/logic concept. A set is a collection of, well, anything you want. In logic, we generally talk about a set of propositions, objects, and other logical concepts. Here we will be talking about a set of propositions. Like atomic propositions, sets are referred to using variables:

A = {p, q}

I have defined the set A as containing the propositions p and q.

Moving forward, I will use the following propositions:
D = "I am dead."

A = "I am alive."

And the following set:
AP = {D, A}

AP stands for "atomic proposition" and is the set of all atomic propositions relevant to our discussion. In this case, D and A.

States:
A state represents the universe at some point in time. More specifically, a state is a set of all atomic propositions true at the same time, at some arbitrary point in time. Any set that represents a state is a subset of AP. That is, a state set can only contain propositions that are also in AP. Essentially AP contains all of our building blocks, and states are different ways to combine those building blocks. Given the AP we defined above, possible states include:

s0 = {} (The Null, or empty, set)

s1 = {D}
s2 = {A}
s3 = {D, A}

The null set is of no use to us, and semantically, s3 is contradictory - I can't be alive and dead at the same time. If we limit ourselves to only the sets that make sense, and renumber, we get:

s0 = {D}

s1 = {A}

Relations:
So far we have AP, the set of all atomic propositions that are relevant to this discussion, and the set of all (acceptable) states (s0, s1, s2...) that are composed of atomic propositions found within AP. Semantically, each state should represent some possible world, similar to modal logic. But we will add another component by relating the states to each other. The relation set, R, is a set of ordered pairs of states such as (s1, s2). Given our states above, the possible ordered pairs are:

(s0, s0)
(s0, s1)
(s1, s0)
(s1, s1)

The set R is a subset of this list; it can't contain anything not on this list. Since each of our states only have one atomic proposition, we can for illustrative purposes, replace the state with its corresponding proposition:

(D, D)
(D, A)
(A, D)
(A, A)

So what does R represent? In this type of logic, R represents an acceptable transition. That is, if we are currently in the state represented by the first item in the ordered pair found in R, then it is acceptable for us to transition to the state represented by the second element in that ordered pair. The above list is reprinted below, with the meaning of the transition:

(D, D) - "I am dead now, and I can continue being dead in the next moment"

(D, A) - "I am dead now, and I can be alive in the next moment"
(A, D) - "I am alive now, and I can be dead in the next moment"
(A, A) - "I am alive now, and I can continue being alive in the netx moment"

We discard the second ordered pair as being unacceptable, we get get our set R:

R = {(s0, s0), (s1, s0), (s1, s1)}

Here we begin to fix some of the problems previously discussed with modal logic. It's not enough that a state represent a possible world, but we want to know if we can get to a future state based upon a previous, or initial state. If I can't get to a future state from the state I'm currently in, then we can't say that I have Free Will regarding choices that exist in those inaccessible future states. This gets us closer to where we need to be, but we're not quite there yet.

To recap:

AP - the set of relevant atomic propositions

States - a set of propositions in AP that can be true at the same time.

R - the set of ordered pairs that represent valid state transitions

What does this give us that modal logic doesn't?

Modal logic only talks about a finite number of propositions and whether they are: true in the actual world, true in some possible world, true in all possible worlds.

There doesn't appear to be a way to easily:

- Talk about whether or not some number of propositions are true in the same possible world (unless that possible world is the actual world)

- Incoporate issues involving time and ordering of events
- Determine if a possible truth can become an actual truth. That is, to determine if the actual world we are in can, through a series of valid state transitions, end up in a possible world where a given proposition is true.

It is this latter one that is important to us, but we are not yet ready to address it in the context, first we have to describe determinism and Free Will in the logic we have modeled above.

More details on the logical concepts discussed above:

I have borrowed heavily from Computation Tree Logic (CTL), specifically the construction of Kripke structures. I have am not, by far, bringing the full force of that logical system to bear here, I am only bringing in the elements I think I necessary to illustrate the points I am trying to make. For one, I want to keep this as simple as possible and two, my research shows different ways of expressing this logic and I want to keep this as simple as possible.

CTL is related to, and is actually an evolution of, modal logic. Bare modal logic has no consideration of time. Adding a temporal element gives you temporal modal logic, which contains operators that denote tense, such as "past" and "future" in the same sense as "possible" and "necessary." Linear Time Logic, is a type of temporal modal logic. CTL is related to LTL, and adds a branching element, though the latter is not fully subsumed into the former.

Free Will and Determinism, Part 4

Introduction: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism.html

Part 2: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-2.html

Part 3: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-3.html

Part 4: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-4.html

Part 5: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-5.html

Part 6: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/09/free-will-and-determinism-part-6.html

Part 7: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/09/free-will-and-determinism-part-7.html

Recap:

We've introduced the incompatibilist logic for Free Will. Essentially Free Will requires some sort of control over future events (by either allowing for alternate possibilities, or by being an ultimate source of control). Determinism forbids this by requiring that all future events be determined (no alternate paths, no individual as ultimate source of own actions).

The objections to these arguments have been addressed and shown to be lacking. No matter how Free Will is described, determinism removes the requirements necessary for its existence.

The last remaining tact, then, is to address the conflict between incompatibilist arguments and human behavior.

These generally come in two flavors:

First:

The issue of Free Will is often tied with moral responsibility. I have deliberately left moral responsibility out of the equation as, while moral responsibility may require Free Will, there are plenty of Free Will actions that are morally neutral.

The argument here is that, regardless of any incompatibilist arguments, we nevertheless act toward people, and respond to them, as if their actions have moral significance. That is, we act as though people are morally responsible for their actions which is the same thing as acting as if they have Free Will.

Second:

If we were to convince people that Free Will was false, then this would adversely affect human behavior. For example, studies have shown that people, when presented with literature suggesting a deterministic world view, are more likely to be dishonest. One interpretation of such studies is that A) people are instictive incompatiblists and B) when biased toward determinism are then biased against Free Will and will take less moral responsibility for their actions. Thus, if we don't have Free Will, and people come to believe that, that will adversely affect our society as people stop taking moral responsibility for their actions.

The problems with these responses are many. First and foremost, they don't actually address the incompatible nature of determinism and Free Will and instead just address the truth or falsehood of Free Will. Second, how we act or what we believe does not entail truth. Acting as though something is true doesn't make it true. Third, the consequences of something being true don't reflect on the truth of that statement, though it may provide incentive for preventing that truth from becoming known.

I will, however, talk a little more about the studies referred to in the second refutation above. As stated, the common interpretation of these studies is that being primed with deterministic texts make people believe less in their own Free Will and then behave in more selfish ways.

One the one hand, it is interesting to note that this interpretation requires that people be innate incompatibilists (not that that lends credence to incompatiblist arguments).

One the other, it isn't the only interpretation. For example, one explanation proposed by Holton (2009) is that, it isn't an issue of Free Will versus Determinism, but rather an issue of Futility. In reading deterministic texts, people don't abandon their belief in Free Will, but nevertheless have impressed upon them the futility of acting freely in light of an outcome that is determined. That is, they can still act freely, it just won't matter.

These refutations, however invalid, do raise a point:

If incompatibilism is true? So what?

The importance of incompatiblism arises in whether or not determinism or Free Will is true. If one is, then the other is false; They can both be false, but at most only one can be true.

Furthermore, any system of beliefs that has a compatabilist view as a core or fundamental component, must be false. So what system of beliefs does that affect?

Reference: Holton, R. (2009). Determinism, Determinism, Self-Efficacy, and the Phenomenology of Free Will. Inquiry, 52(4), 412–428.

Free Will and Determinism, part 3

Introduction: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism.html
Part 2: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-2.html
Part 3: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-3.html
Part 4: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-4.html
Part 5: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-5.html
Part 6: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/09/free-will-and-determinism-part-6.html
Part 7: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/09/free-will-and-determinism-part-7.html

One interpretation of Free Will attributes the people power over facts of the future, which is addressed by the incompatibilist argument:

• No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.


• No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).


• Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

Issues with this have primarily come in the form over differences in "facts of the past" and "the laws of nature" with regards to Free Will and Determinism. Clearly we do not have direct control over the facts of the past, nor do we have direct control over the laws of nature. On the surface it would seem that this argument holds.

Some compatabilists contend that applying these definitions to Free Will is nonsensical and not required. For example, even if I don't have control over the facts of the past, and even if the facts of the past determine the facts of the future, it is still possible for me to choose other than I did because it is possible for the facts of the past to have been other than what they were to lead to a future where I chose otherwise.

Another way to state this is if some version of the past, P1, entails some version of the future F1, then the fact that P1 entails F1 (P1 -> F1) doesn't negate the possibility of another future, say F2, it's just that if F2 were the case, then it would have been entailed by a different past, say, P2. That only one past and one future actually happen is immaterial. That we can't alter what actually happens is also immaterial. What matters is that, if multiple pasts are possible, then so are the futures they entail. Since there are multiple possible futures with regards to our choices, we have Free Will.

This reasoning also applies to the "laws of nature" aspect. Instead of the past entailing the future, the laws of nature entail it. Since other laws of nature are possible, then so are other futures and we still have Free Will. Ultimately, the manner in which the past and the laws of nature entail the future do not forbid us from having Free Will.

This invokes a conception of Free Will using what is known as modal logic. Without getting too in depth, modal logic involves possibilities, actualities, and necessities and is often visualized through the concept of "possible worlds." Something is actually true if it actually happened, something is possibly true if it could have happened in some possible world, and something necessarily happened if it must happen in all possible worlds.

The terms "possibly" and "necessity" are related to each other. If something is necessary, then it is not possible for it not to happen, and if something is possible, then it is not necessary for it not to happen. In short, we can consider something as "possible" if there are some possible starting conditions which could logically result in it and we can consider something "necessary" if there are not possible conditions which wouldn't result in it.

In this sense, we are judged as having Free Will if any action is possible, whether or not the conditions required to bring about the alternate possibility happened. If P1 entails F1 and P2 entails F2, and both P1 and P2 are possible, then so are F1 and F2.* Since F1 and F2 are possibilities in the modal sense, then we have Free Will, even if they arise from drastically different past conditions.

A more in depth analysis shows that this definition of Free Will is lacking in two ways. First, there are scenarios which meet these requirements that defy our application of Free Will and, two, it contradicts with determinism at a more fundamental level.

First, consider this scenario:

I come to a narrow bridge and see a person on the other side that is hurt and needs my help. I can choose to cross the bridge or not. So I have Free Will in this decision.

However, what if there is a storm that has knocked a tree down across the bridge, preventing from me getting to the person. Do I still have Free Will in helping the person? According to the modal interpretation of Free Will: Yes.

Take P1 to mean a past where the bridge is open and accessible, and F1 to be a future arising from that past where I help the person.

Take P2 to mean a past where the bridge is closed off and F2 to be a future arising from that past where I don't help the person.

Since both pasts are possible, so are both futures and, therefore, I have Free Will. I freely chose not to help the person even if a tree blocks my path.

Clearly this is absurd and indicates something lacking in this depiction of Free Will.

The error comes in how to resolve this depiction of Free Will with determinism. We are taking for granted the possibility of other pasts or other laws of nature. If determinism is true then any past and any set of the laws of nature must be determined. So, on what are they determined?

If something is determined, then it is determined by some preexisting state. If there are two possible laws of nature, and determinism is true, then they must each be determined by mutually exclusive preexisting states, each of which themselves must be determined.

We can avoid infinite regression only be accepting some initial state which is determined, not by some temporally prior preexisting state, but by simply being necessary. That is, it is not possible for it to be any other way; it is determined by its own necessity. But mutually exclusive laws of nature can't be necessary; there can only be one necessary set of the laws of nature. Through this, we eliminate the other possibilities as illogical.

This applies to the facts of the past as well. We must start at some initial set of conditions that are necessary. Since we have reduced reality to a single set of the facts of the past, and a single set of the laws of the nature, only one unique sequence of future events can be determined from that, precluding us from claiming Free Will on the basis of possible pasts or possible alternates to the actual laws of nature.

Some may conclude from this reasoning that determinism is therefore false, which may be the case. It nevertheless shows that it is incompatible with Free Will.

* the argument here may not be obvious. Essentially I have argued that if P1 -> F1 and P1 is possible, then so is F1. We can demonstrate this via contradiction:

Assume that F1 is not possible. If F1 is not possible then anything that entails F1 is also not possible. P1 entails F1, but is possible, given our premises. This is a contradiction, thefore F1 is possible.

Free Will and Determinism, part 2

Introduction: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism.html
Part 2: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-2.html
Part 3: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-3.html
Part 4: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-4.html
Part 5: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-5.html
Part 6: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/09/free-will-and-determinism-part-6.html
Part 7: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/09/free-will-and-determinism-part-7.html

At the end of the previous post, I indicated that I will be addressing the following refutations of incompatibilist arguments:

• Refutation attacking the nature of the “Necessity of the Past” and the “Laws of Nature” as identified by the Consequence Argument.



• Refutations that attack the nature of Free Will as presented by incompatibilist arguments.



• Practical issues that arise with incompatibilist arguments.

With the implication that this is the order I intend on addressing them. However, responses to the introduction have caused me to rethink this, and I'll be tackling the second one first: Refutations that attack the nature of Free Will as presented by incompatibilist arguments.

Before that, a clarification. In the introduction I stated:

If there exists no clear definition or conception of Free Will, then how can it be used in any sort of logical argument or philosophical discussion? It can’t. At least not if one expects to have any sort of constructive conversation.

This can be interpreted in a manner which not not entirely correct. Or, more simply, this statement is false.

This was pointed out to me by commenter Bauer:

[I]t is false to suppose that we need a full and uncontroversial definition [of Free Will] —as you seem to imply.

Yes, this is true. Bauer explained this using an example of the definition of "bachelor." I will also add to this with another explanation.

The existence and properties of atoms have been pondered and studied since the ancient Greeks. However, our current understanding of the atom, within the domain of Quantum Mechanics, is less than a century old, and isn't even complete now. So, if it isn't complete, how can we fruitfully talk about atoms?

We can talk about atoms through reductionist methods by discussing what properties and behaviors they have. For the purposes of discussion, we can reduce atoms to a collection of properties (While acknolweding that atoms are more than just those properties, may have more properties than we know about, and whose properties may be different than what we have identified). Instead of talking about atoms as completely described entities, we focus our conversation instead on the properties attributed to atoms, and then talk about the consequences of having those properties. If we conclude that a property should result in some behavior or consequence, and atoms have said property, then, logically, we can attribute that behavior or consequence to atoms. Alternatively, if we can show that atoms do not exhibit the behavior or result in consequences that are entailed by some property, we can prove that atoms do not have that property.

In this same manner we can have a constructive conversation about Free Will without needing to produce a complete and uncontroversial definition; we can assign properties to Free Will and then talk about what those properties require or entail.

Now, to the matter at hand:

In incompatibilist arguments, Free Will has been described as:

• 
  
  Being able to have done otherwise than what was done.



• 
  
  Being the ultimate source of one's actions.



• 
  
  Having some power over the facts of the future.

Being Able To Do Otherwise:

Free Will is most often described as having some sort of control over how events unfold. An action was performed freely when, if we were to do it over again, we could have done other than what we actually did. This appeals to us on an emotional level, as many times we think about actions we have taken and consider "what if" we had chosen otherwise, for better or for worse.
The question, then, does our ability to conceive of counterfactual scenarios reflect the logical possibility of those scenarios having actually taken place? Not if determinism is true, say incompatibilists.Some have challenged this perception of Free Will. Philosophy Harry Frankfurt presents the following scenario:

Jones has resolved to shoot Smith. Black has learned of Jones's plan and wants Jones to shoot Smith. But Black would prefer that Jones shoot Smith on his own. However, concerned that Jones might waver in his resolve to shoot Smith, Black secretly arranges things so that, if Jones should show any sign at all that he will not shoot Smith (something Black has the resources to detect), Black will be able to manipulate Jones in such a way that Jones will shoot Smith. As things transpire, Jones follows through with his plans and shoots Smith for his own reasons. No one else in any way threatened or coerced Jones, offered Jones a bribe, or even suggested that he shoot Smith. Jones shot Smith under his own steam. Black never intervened.

In this case, Jones cannot do otherwise than to shoot Smith, yet when he does so without Black's intervention, we still conclude that he acted freely.

I agree with Frankfurt's assessment: the ability to do otherwise in terms of outward action does not properly map Free Will as we perceive it. However, I don't think this dispels incompatiblist notions. Rather it causes us to think carefully about how we model Free Will. Talking about possible actions is merely a convention. To do something freely, we must have first freely chosen to do it. In many cases, what we do is done as a result of a free choice. Frankfurts rather exotic scenario is the black swan to this kind of induction. But rather than disproving incompatibility, it just forces us to talk about Free Will as what it truly is: Free Will. The freedom here is in the choosing, not necessarily in the doing. In Frankfurt's example, Jones' choice was free, even if he could not have done otherwise than to shoot Smith. In choosing to do so, his action was free (as a result of a free choice). If he chose otherwise, then his action, though resulting on the same outcome, would not have been free, having been a result of Black's choice.

Acknowledging Frankfurt's criticism, we can reform our incompatibilist argument:

• If a person chooses of her own free will, then she could have chosen otherwise.



• If determinism is true, no one can chose other than one actually chooses.



• Therefore, if determinism is true, no one chooses of her own free will.

While this makes the first premise more acceptable in terms of the objection, it makes the second premise questionable, at least at first glance.

Commonly determinism is thought of as causal, macroscopic determinism. This is thinking that has motivated ancient philosophers to believe the world is run by laws of nature which can be articulated and generalized. This got a boost with Newton which strengthened the formulations of such laws by converting them into mathematical statements. Modern physics which acknowledges events which are random and uncaused, strikes a significant blow to this kind of determinism.

This is not the only kind of determinism, however. Determinism in the sense used here, is to say that all facts are determined by some preexisting state of affairs. Another type of determinism is theological. If there is a being with perfect knowledge, then A) whatever he knows is true, that is, his knowledge of something entails its truth and B) he knows everything. The combined affects of these is if there is a being with perfect knowledge, then the truth of every proposition is entailed. This is a very simplistic representation, and I intend to explore this further in subsequent posts.

In short, the restatement of the second premise is nothing controversial. If determinism is true then everything, our actions AND choices are, therefore, determined. Free Will requires that our choices be free, ergo determinism and Free Will are incompatible.

It is understandable that the second premise can cause ill ease as it cross domains with another debated philosophical concept: mind-brain dualism. The restatement of the second premise, combined with an instinctual understanding of determinism as causal determinism, seems to presume materialism. That is, our choices are simply a result of the natural operation of our brain, a purely physical object, which is then subject to causal, physical determiniation. It would not be correct to simply presume the truth of materialism or the answer to the mind-brain dualism, but the alternative is to suggest that some non-physical entity outside of our brain ultimately makes the choice, which brings us to:

Being the Ultimate Source of One's Actions:

In alignment with Frankfurt, we could perhaps rephrase this as "Being the Ultimate Source of One's Choices."

Here the waters get a little muddy. What does it mean to be an "ultimate source?" It means that, when tracing back the causes of some event which is proposed to have been a result of a free choice, A) we eventually come to a stop and B) when we stop, we resid at some iniating decision within ourselves. This also raises the question of what "we" are in the philosophical sense. Here we generally rely on our perceptions. I perceive myself as making a choice and being the source of the choice.

By itself, this is questionable. If something outside of us was the cause of our choices, we wouldn't perceive it because it's outside of ourselves. But just because we don't perceive something doesn't mean it isn't there.

Determinism is incompatible even with this because it requires that all things, including our choices, are entailed by some preexisting state of affairs. So, in tracing back the causes of some event which we perceive as having freely chosen to do, we will eventually come to our perception of the inital choice. Then we ask the question: was that choice entailed by some preexisting state of affairs? If determinism is true, then yes and, since we have reach the limit of our perception, what entails that choice exists outside of ourselves.

Here we implicitly limit what can we can be a source of to that which we perceive, but the argument holds water regardless. While the limitation of "ourselves" to "our perceptions" can be debated, what isn't debatable is the fact that we are beings that occupy a finite space of time. Tracing back a causal chain of events necessarily takes us to prior and prior events. Eventually we will reach a point in time before we exist, and such causes would then by "outside" of ourselves; we would not be the ultimate source of our actions.

Lastly, we have:


Having Some Power over Facts of the Future:

This is actually a combination of the previous concepts. That is, we have power over some fact of the future if we A) could have chosen otherwise, and the decision of choices was a result of that power or B) we are the ultimate source of some chain of events that we have power over by virtue of the fact that we initiated that chain of events.

This issue depends on how facts of the future can be determined which, the argument states, are as a result of the facts of the past and the laws of nature, which I will address in the next post.

Free Will and Determinism, Introduction

Introduction: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism.html

Part 2: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-2.html

Part 3: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-3.html

Part 4: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-4.html

Part 5: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/08/free-will-and-determinism-part-5.html

Part 6: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/09/free-will-and-determinism-part-6.html

Part 7: http://www.themindisaterriblething.com/2011/09/free-will-and-determinism-part-7.html

Free Will has been an important and controversial topic with regards to philosophy in general, theology in particular. Given the amount of thought and writing that has been dedicated to Free Will, there lacks an agreed upon conception of what it actually is. There are elements of Free Will that are agreed upon, such as the notion that the existence of Free Will confers responsibility, most often of a moral nature, on agents which have it.

Determinism is another philosophical doctrine which states, roughly, that the states of future propositions are determined by the states of past propositions. Determinism is most commonly associated with causal determinism: that all events have causes such that the event could have been predicted from sufficient knowledge of the cause. This type of determinism has been mused about since the Ancient Greeks, but gained strength with Newton’s Classical Mechanics. It is illustrated by Laplace’s Demon by stating that if one knows everything about the state of the universe at a given time, along with the rules that govern the universe, then one can predict any future state of the universe. One common thread among different types of determinism is that, given initial conditions, there is only one possible way for things to unfold. That is, it is not possible for things to turn out differently than they have, as they were determined by prior conditions.

With the apparent causal determinism implied by Classical Mechanics, many saw issues with determinism and Free Will. Various arguments have suggested that, if some form of determinism is true, then Free Will is not. Note that this is irrespective of the issue of whether or not determinism or Free Will actually exist, just that they cannot co-exist. Those who support such arguments are known as incompatibilists and those that refute such arguments are compatibilists.

If there exists no clear definition or conception of Free Will, then how can it be used in any sort of logical argument or philosophical discussion? It can’t. At least not if one expects to have any sort of constructive conversation. Historically incompatibilist have taken the initiative, presenting arguments that attempt to show that Free Will and determinism cannot coexist (are incompatible). In doing so, they have accepted the burden of defining exactly what those concepts are. These arguments at least give us a glimpse as to what Free Will may be, though many compatibilist refutations rest upon the notion that Free Will is other than what has been described.

Incompatibilist arguments can be organized into two categories: the alternate possibilities and the source model arguments. The alternate possibilities (or Garden of Forking paths) suggests, roughly, that:

1. 
   
   If a person acts of her own free will, then she could have done otherwise.


2. 
   
   If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise than one actually does.


3. 
   
   Therefore, if determinism is true, no one acts of her own free will.

Whereas the Source Model argument states:

1. A person acts of her own free will only if she is its ultimate source.


2. 
   
   If determinism is true, no one is the ultimate source of her actions.


3. 
   
   Therefore, if determinism is true, no one acts of her own free will.

In more contemporary times, these arguments can be rolled-up into an argument known as the consequence argument:

1. 
   
   No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.


2. 
   
   No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).


3. 
   
   Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.

The combined power of the “facts of the past” and the “laws of nature” work not only to limit our possible options, as with the Alternate Possibilities argument, but also ensure that the ultimate source of our actions do not end with us, as with the Source Model argument. Note that there is no mention of Free Will in the consequence argument; it’s implied. Essentially, there is an implicit premise that states: “If anyone has Free Will, then they have power over some facts of the future” and the implicit conclusion that states: “Therefore, no one has Free Will, since no one has power over any facts of the future.”

Refutations have come in various forms. Some refute the definition of Free Will as presented and attempt to present a definition that can coexist with determinism as presented. Some argue with the presentation of determinism, especially with regards to the Consequence Argument. Some have attacked the inferences made by the arguments.

Others have addressed the topic from practical, rather than philosophical means. I intend, in subsequent posts, to discuss some of these refutations, namely:

• 
  
  Refutation attacking the nature of the “Necessity of the Past” and the “Laws of Nature” as identified by the Consequence Argument.


• 
  
  Refutations that attack the nature of Free Will as presented by incompatibilist arguments.


• 
  
  Practical issues that arise with incompatibilist arguments.

References: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/